THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

VOL. LVIII, NO. 5: MARCH 2, 1961

CONTENTS

Dewey's Religious Thought: The Challenge of Evolution: HOWARD L. PARSONS 113

Some Problems Concerning Dewey's View of Reason: CHAUNCEY B. DOWNES 121

Book Review

EDWARD G. BALLARD, *Art and Analysis:* JOSEPH MARGOLIS 137

New Books 140

Notes and News 140

PUBLISHED FORTNIGHTLY

BY THE

JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, INC.

THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

FOUNDED BY FREDERICK J. E. WOODBRIDGE AND WENDELL T. BUSH

EDITORS: Herbert W. Schneider, John H. Randall, Jr., Robert D. Cumming, and George L. Kline.

BOOK REVIEW EDITOR: Sidney Morgenbesser.

CONSULTING EDITORS: Alexandre Koyré, José Ferrater Mora.

MANAGING EDITOR: Emerson Buchanan.

Communications to the editors should be addressed to the Managing Editor, 713 Philosophy Hall, Columbia University, New York 27, N. Y. Subscriptions and advertisements should be sent to THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, 713 Philosophy Hall, Columbia University, New York 27, N. Y. The annual subscription price (26 numbers) is $6.50; to students, $5.25. The price of single numbers is $0.50; double numbers, $1.00; complete volumes, $7.00.

THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY is owned by the Journal of Philosophy, Inc., and published bi-weekly at Prince and Lemon Sts., Lancaster, Pa. Editorial Office: 713 Philosophy Hall, Columbia University, New York 27, N. Y. President, Albert G. Redpath; Vice President, John H. Randall, Jr.; Treasurer, Frederick A. Dewey; Secretary, Corliss Lamont.

Second-class postage paid at Lancaster, Pa.

PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH

An International Quarterly

Edited by

MARVIN FARBER

in cooperation with A DISTINGUISHED GROUP OF AMERICAN AND FOREIGN SCHOLARS

Descriptive, analytic, critical, and historical articles representing the major contemporary trends in philosophy. In addition to papers on phenomenology, *PPR* publishes studies in a wide range of areas including ethics and value theory, metaphysics, aesthetics, logic, language, political, social, and religious philosophy, and theory of knowledge and the sciences.

Published by
THE UNIVERSITY OF BUFFALO
Buffalo 14, New York

Annual subscription rate, $6 for libraries and institutions, $5 for individuals; $1.50 per copy

A list of the contents of past issues since 1940 will be sent upon request.

VOLUME LVIII, No. 5 MARCH 2, 1961

THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

DEWEY'S RELIGIOUS THOUGHT: THE CHALLENGE OF EVOLUTION

DEWEY was the origin of a new species of philosopher, and, so far as his thought was applied to religion, a new species of religious philosopher. We shall consider Dewey's significance as a religious philosopher by looking at the sources of his religious attitude and his attitude toward religion, and his concept of the "religious"; and we shall raise certain questions about his religious thought, and suggest the implications of that thought for an experimental approach to religion.

THE REVOLT AGAINST DUALISMS

Dewey's early philosophy emerged as an effort to cope with the conflicts which he absorbed from his environment in the 1870's: Darwinian science vs. authoritarian religion, Scottish intuitionalism and transcendentalism vs. British empiricism, Hegelianism vs. the fixities of traditional philosophic and religious thought. Puritanism and Kantianism had sundered things into irreconcilable compartments. Political liberalism was still embattled against the doctrine of divine right, now retreated to theology. Economic liberalism was in its lusty heyday, as the Gospel of Wealth pitted itself against the Gospel of Love. In addition, the young Dewey felt the mixing, disruptive forces of industrialization, urbanization, and immigration.[1]

In the midst of this, Dewey felt strongly the quest for emotional and intellectual unity. He tells us how a course in physiology, in his junior year in college, using a book by Huxley as text, first answered his need for intellectual synthesis. A senior copestone course did the same. At this time Dewey underwent "a trying personal crisis" which had been engendered by a "sense of divisions and separations" borne in upon him "as a consequence of a heritage of New England culture." He felt "a painful op-

[1] George Dykhuizen, "An Early Chapter in the Life of John Dewey," *Journal of the History of Ideas*, Vol. XIII, No. 4 (October, 1952), pp. 563–572.

pression—or, rather, . . . an inward laceration."[2] Yet Dewey's sensitivity to change and conflict seemed more than cultural in origin. "I seem to be unstable," he wrote in 1930, "chameleon-like, yielding one after another to many diverse and even incompatible influences; struggling to assimilate something from each and yet striving to carry it forward in a way that is logically consistent with what has been learned from its predecessors."[3] Is not this the Hegelian temper, led to identify itself with all modes of being, yet to lift them up into a grand synthesis? Is not this the pluralistic mind which is an epitome and paradigm of nature herself? Is not this the embodiment of the democratic ideal: the en-masse man who is large, who contradicts himself, and who contains multitudes?

Here is where Hegelianism appeared as "a special attraction" and "an immense release" for the distressed Dewey. He embraced that system with a religious fervor; and while the crisis of his divided soul did not "constitute a leading philosophical problem," yet the vital and bold work of Hegel operated as a great "liberation."[4]

From his graduate days onward, Dewey in fact desired to emancipate the study of philosophy from religion and the theological questions to which it had been chained. He was convinced that the way to illuminate and enhance the religious values was to develop "the great intellectual transformation"[5] then in progress (and induced by Darwinism), and to detach those values from the concept of the "supernatural," which "tends by its own nature to breed the dogmatic and divisive spirit."[6] For Dewey the naturalist, all compartmentalization, in theory or practice, is anathema. Naturalism takes seriously "the most revolutionary discovery yet made" by science, the discovery of *process*.[7] A naturalistic study of religions seeks to understand them in their incommensurable diversity; a naturalistic norm for religion points in the direction of a *common* faith which is fluid, flexible, growing,

[2] John Dewey, "From Absolutism to Experimentalism," in *Contemporary American Philosophy*, Vol. II, edited by G. P. Adams and W. P. Montague (New York: Macmillan, 1930).

[3] *Ibid.*

[4] *Ibid.*

[5] *Ibid.*

[6] John Dewey, "Experience, Knowledge and Value: A Rejoinder," in *The Philosophy of John Dewey*, edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp (Evanston and Chicago: Northwestern University, 1939), p. 595.

[7] John Dewey, *Reconstruction in Philosophy* (New York: The New American Library of World Literature, 1950), p. 12.

and unifying—as over against a special faith which is static, rigid, arresting, and isolating.

But the discussion of religious issues remained for Dewey a secondary issue. The "religious" is a quality that attaches to faithful activity in behalf of values about which one has convictions that are active and courageous.[8] It is something in Dewey's thought that is taken for granted, assumed to be pervasive (though in need of development), thought to be consequent upon the degree of depth of our shared life. Thus religious values, he says, are the "out-flowering"[9] of thoughts and desires long and unconsciously incubating; and man's primary work is that of social reconstruction. Dewey's attitude reveals the influence of his liberal evangelical training and the Pietistic notion of religion as unbroken religious experience. The consequence of it is that when Dewey does write about religion he writes about the common faith of men and the religion of our common life.

The Religious Dimension

Morality, for Dewey, has to do with the discernment and control of means-ends relations in experience, and with the expansion of connected satisfactions. It is a philosophical and humanized version of Julian Huxley's "non-restrictive" evolution: "improvements which permit or facilitate further improvements."[10] But the religious dimension embraces and supports the moral. It includes:

1. *Wholeness* of attitude and adjustment. The "unification of the self" is achieved "through allegiance to inclusive ideal ends."[11] Such a change relates "to our being in its entirety."[12] The generic activity of man is to restore the unity that is broken up and obstructed in activity. In the context of human desire and consequent meaning, "physical" objects with their own power over man become transformed into "ideal" meanings and means securing the power of man over them.

This wholeness is always partial and individualized. For "the idea of a thoroughgoing and deep-seated harmonizing of the self with the Universe (as a name for the totality of conditions with which the self is connected) operates only through imagination."[13]

[8] John Dewey, *A Common Faith* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1934), p. 27.

[9] *Reconstruction in Philosophy*, p. 164.

[10] *Evolution as a Process* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1954), p. 11.

[11] *A Common Faith*, p. 33.

[12] *Ibid.*, p. 16.

[13] *Ibid.*, p. 19.

2. A sense of "the enduring and comprehensive whole."[14] For the whole achieved by man is coterminous with, or is an individualized aspect of, a wider and *existential whole*. Religious experience, for Dewey, is marked by "the sense of an enveloping whole."[15] Every end of human activity which is carved out of events by the power of consciousness and is symbolized and unified in the imagination, is the rich focus of myriad connections. The human ideal, in short, is embedded in a context of conditions, causes, and consequences which trail off indefinitely into a complex and vague background. The religious attitude is the intimative sense of this. It is a cosmic piety, humility, and reverence. This sustaining, existential whole is "not a goal to be attained" but "a significance to be felt."[16]

3. A sense of our *dependence* upon the good of nature. An experienced and disciplined mind "knows its own littleness and impotencies," says Dewey. "We know that though the universe slay us still we may trust, for our lot is one with whatever is good in existence."[17] Religion in this sense "liberates" us from "the conceit of carrying the load of the universe."[18] It does so as it introduces "perspective"[19] and enables man to view his life under the aspect of what is universal.

4. A sense of *community* and communion with all that sustains and sanctions man's efforts and achievements. We are implicated in the processes of nature, but our own human, symbolic, and social processes are fruits of that nature, and in turn assimilate and transform elements of that nature. Our human community is what we most directly know of the hidden and nurturing natural community. It is the wholeness of nature minded, symbolized, and socialized. It is the "matrix" of our ideals and the "source of the values" of our imagination and labor. Human inquiry is not merely the exemplification of nature; it is nature refined, sharpened, instrumented, and made more flexible and viable. *Human* nature is nature communicating to itself in the communications of men, nature divided and united into men, that as pluralized they might (as Emerson has it) help each other.[20]

[14] John Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct* (New York: The Modern Library, 1930), p. 330.

[15] *Ibid.*, p. 264.

[16] *Ibid.*, p. 263.

[17] John Dewey, *Experience and Nature* (Chicago and London: The Open Court Publishing Co., 1925), p. 420.

[18] *Human Nature and Conduct*, p. 331.

[19] *A Common Faith*, p. 24.

[20] See *Experience and Nature*.

CRITIQUE

1. What is the origin, character, and status of that "whole" which, when man is effectively adjusted to it, produces changes in him that are "inclusive," "harmonizing," and "enduring"?[21] At times Dewey talks as if this whole were in the nature of events, waiting to be known, to be connected with, and to be used and leaned on in its full resources of support for man. At other times he speaks as if the "enveloping whole" were primarily a human creation fashioned out of man's interactions with events, resident in the imagination, and validated by human discovery and practice. At still other times he rejects both of these emphases (Hegelian and Comtean) and declares that ideals are neither antecedent realities nor rootless possibilities but reflexes, in an objective but relative way, of the actual contexts of nature.[22] "For there are," he says, "forces in nature and society that *generate* and *support* the ideals. They are *further* unified by the action that gives them coherence and solidity."[23]

2. What is meant by the "religious" attitude? On the one hand, Dewey stresses man's dependence on "invisible powers"—"all the conditions of nature and human association that support and deepen the sense of values which carry one through periods of darkness and despair."[24] On the other, he speaks of "faith in the possibilities of human experience,"[25] where faith means the directing of the self beyond itself by an idea of integration, and a tenacious pursuit of certain general and enduring values. On the one hand, faith is defined as a voluntary submission or an active trust; on the other, as an intellectual and emotional attitude toward certain ideal possibilities for action. On the one hand, the "object" of faith is the natural events and structures which man only faintly understands, controls, and foresees; on the other, it is the ideal ends of the projective imagination.

How can ideals sustain us? Taken as abstract possibilities, as envisaged structures of things that might be, they simply cannot sustain us. What sustains us, instead, is the whole body of our impulsive life, our feelings, dispositions, habits, and the deep matrix of community and association wherein we live and move and have our being. It is the causes, conditions, and consequences

[21] *A Common Faith*, p. 16.

[22] *Human Nature and Conduct*, p. 318.

[23] *A Common Faith*, p. 51. (Italics mine.)

[24] *Ibid.*, p. 14.

[25] John Dewey, in *Living Philosophies* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1931), p. 29.

of ideals which sustain and drive us, and to whose power and release our faith, as activity, should be directed. If, moreover, as Dewey contends, intelligence and ideas are "not ours originally or by production" but "sprout and vegetate" and "come from deep unconscious sources,"[26] then the proper function of a creative faith is to concentrate on the cultivation of these sources and so by indirection improve our ideas and ideals. At best, ideals can inform and guide such faith. And even if one continues to struggle manfully for the realization of certain ideals once they have emerged, the faith of such struggle would issue in ashes in the mouth if one lacked the religious sense of an environing support and a source of renewal. Dewey himself acknowledges this.

3. In this connection we may ask: Is God actual or ideal? Dewey defines "God" as "the *active* relation between ideal and actual."[27] This relation is a dialectical one: existent goods (events and relations) give rise to idealized goods, which, as made relevant to actuality, are modified by and in turn modify existent goods, adding to them, if successful, a new increment of value as data for a new idealization. God might be termed the dialectical growth of value in the world. This is a process that renders continuous man's creative powers with the creative powers already established in nature. Here, in his religious thought, as in his general philosophical thought, Dewey endeavors to bridge the dualism that has divided Western culture since Graeco-Roman times.

But Dewey's solution is ambiguous. That ambiguity on the question of whether deity is objective or subjective, natural or human—really the question of theism vs. humanism—may be laid at the door, the revolving door, of Dewey's metaphysics. That door now opens on human experience, now on nature, as the scene to which we must go for our answers to ultimate fact. For Dewey, the final solution seems to be the route of transaction between man and objective events as exhibited in human inquiry. Yet, dissatisfied with the narrow idealism which this answer might lead to, Dewey interprets this transaction as only a special and refined case of what happens throughout nature, at least in its living form. Dewey is an evolutionary naturalist who sees thought as one phase of the practical thrust of life, and who sees such an adjustive thrust as a generic trait of natural evolution. Consciousness, a late and improvised thing, is thrown up as an instrument in behalf of such a thrust; it serves an antecedent process. Dewey's defini-

[26] *Human Nature and Conduct*, p. 314.
[27] *A Common Faith*, p. 51.

tion of "faith" rests back upon the deep biological propulsion of living forms toward survival.

Though Dewey (alongside his intense instrumentalism) pleads movingly for recognition of the non-cognitive aspects of experience and hence of nature—"poetry may have a metaphysical import," he says, "as well as science"[28]—he does not, to my knowledge, argue analogously with respect to religious experience or events. And though he reacted strongly against the Hegelianism of his youth, its objective idealism remained an implicit and, in religious matters, an unexamined premise of his thought. There *is* a dynamic creativity in nature, and man is its epitomization; man is, in a sense, the experimental power of nature brought to consciousness. Dewey, of course, does not say this, but much that he does say presupposes it. That he does not say it may be due partly to his emphasis on human effort and ideals; partly to his synechistic reluctance to divide deity from man (what nature hath joined together, let no philosopher or god put asunder); partly to his deep aversion to any disingenuous loading of the moral dice in the game of cosmology: "*the* philosophic fallacy": the "conversion of eventual functions into antecedent existence."[29]

What *is* the "active relation between ideal and actual"? It does not descend like a dove out of a supernatural blue but is expressive of a structure of possibility inherent in the human situation, and, if evolution is to be taken seriously as Dewey takes it, inherent in the pre-human situation. The actualization of value is impossible without some antecedent ground for creation. Creation as a process is the generation of novel qualities and relations, but its transcending *of* the present is rooted *in* the present. Process has its antecedent side and its consequent side. Ultimate actuality in process philosophy is a thrust into the future. If God is one of such actualities, then the question of God's antecedence or ideality becomes secondary; and the primary question for religious thought is, What is the character of such a process?

I believe that Dewey's synechism at this point obscures the issue. God as defined by Dewey is not identical with man, for the process embraces powers "that generate and support the good as experienced and as ideal" and as working "*within* as well as without man."[30] This is not merely a verbal matter of how one shall use the term "God"; it is the question of whether there are creative factors in the human situation which man does not

[28] *Experience and Nature*, p. 19.
[29] *Ibid.*, p. 29.
[30] *A Common Faith*, p. 54.

entirely make, know, foresee, or control. Awareness of the distinction between man's cognitive, manipulative creativity, and a creativity other than that, does make a difference, I think, in conduct.

Toward an Experimental Approach to Religion

The history of thought offers us a limited range of possibilities for defining the divine: the supernatural; the ideal as possible; the ideal as Being; the natural and creative. (We leave aside scepticism.) Dewey takes this last alternative, but leaves it, we believe, ambiguous and undeveloped. He takes it because, true to his empirical naturalism, it is thrust upon him in his experimental transactions with men and the other events of nature. If one accepts with Dewey the primacy of things-as-experienced, in all their change and plurality, where can one turn for guidance? For Dewey, one does not turn, one simply faces into what and how one experiences: one simply finds the criterion for conduct in the business of the "live creature" as it seeks ends (with their attached means) requisite to its living thrust.

The living thrust of the human creature is social in origin and consequence. It leads and drives the individual into transactions with things, events, and persons by way of the recorded and immediate symbols, the funded and novel meanings of his fellow creatures. Here it is that man finds his home, his "matrix," and the "source of his values."[31] Here, in an experimental give-and-take which all of nature prefigures, man produces and undergoes communication—"of all affairs," says Dewey, "the most wonderful . . . a wonder by the the side of which transubstantiation pales."[32] Here is the central locus of the religious—the experimental locus, set in the larger locus of nature. Here we can commence to locate and discriminate what man can do and what he cannot do in his creative advance. For learning and growth—the process by which man comes to feel and respond, to think and control, to communicate and to be communicated to, to coöperate and to criticize—this growth, which is set in the context of social transactions, surely involves factors, creative factors, which no one individual or even group of individuals can fully generate or manipulate. An experimental approach to religion would search for such factors, define them, empirically investigate the conditions under which they occur, take action to produce such conditions,

[31] *Ibid.*, p. 85.
[32] *Experience and Nature*, p. 166.

and undergo the consequences. As philosophy of religion it would take seriously Dewey's statement:

> The next synthetic movement in philosophy will emerge when the significance of the social sciences and arts has become an object of reflective attention in the same way that mathematical and physical sciences have been made the objects of thought in the past, and when their full import is fully grasped.[33]

Dewey was among the first to grasp and anticipate in a profound way the revolution wrought by the idea of evolution. Before Darwin, civilizations and philosophies had justified and guided their activities by the presumption of firm and final forms. These forms (in Idealism, Supernaturalism, Aristotelianism, Newtonianism) were thought to constitute the very character of man and the cosmos—or of God. With one stroke Darwinism had done all such systems in. Peirce immediately saw its significance when he declared laws to be imperfect habits that had *grown* into being from spontaneities and tendencies. To apply this evolutionary judgment to every social product, institution, or system is to say, "This too shall pass away." But it also impels us to search more deeply, and in an experimental way, into the character of creative advance in personality and society; to find more clearly, and secure more widely, what does in fact heal the "inward laceration" that afflicts us all; to discriminate what man can do and cannot do in this process; and to test and deepen Dewey's claim that the final value of anything consists in its consequences for the growth of human community as a natural enterprise.

HOWARD L. PARSONS

COE COLLEGE

SOME PROBLEMS CONCERNING DEWEY'S VIEW OF REASON

I

JOHN Dewey has been accused of denigrating reason, destroying the intellectual basis of philosophical thought, and, in the process, subverting our educational ideals. Yet perhaps the most insistent theme in Dewey's writings is his advocacy of intelligence. Indeed, in his book *A Common Faith*, he sees even the true value of religion as lying in intelligent activity. In this paper I shall try to resolve some aspects of this paradox by means of an examination of

[33] "From Absolutism to Experimentalism."

Dewey's view of reason. Such an examination will have a larger relevance than the merely technical problems of one man's philosophy. The twentieth century has seen a resurgence of philosophies hostile to reason, or at least to traditional notions of rationality. The fact that Dewey is under fire both from rationalists and existentialists may indicate that his view of reason is totally unacceptable. Or it may mean that there is a possibility of mediation. Also Dewey's effort to install reason in the center of life's activities opposes one of the most subtle and widespread forms of irrationalism, viz., positivism.

II

The great attraction of Dewey's view of reason is that he gives us a genetic account; reason is naturalized and made continuous with human activity in general. The corresponding difficulty is that the activities of reason proper, logic and mathematics, seem to lose the characteristics that we have come to feel belong to them. We are all rationalists enough to sympathize with a realistic view of reason; it does appear to give us a realm of certainty and eternal truths. It is only recently that a "linguistic" theory of *a priori* knowledge has been offered as an explanation of the peculiar certainty that this form of knowledge gives us. But the linguistic theory meets with opposition not only from professional philosophers of a rationalistic persuasion; "common sense" seems also to incline to the view that mathematics and logic give us a permanent hold on the truth. And since the usual non-professional view of truth is that it is a correspondence with states of affairs, we are easily led to a rationalistic metaphysics. If we are going to accept Dewey's position on these matters, one of our tasks will be to explain the apparent dichotomy between truths of reason and truths of fact.

The difficulties of rationalism are well known. If "reality" is rational, we are required to have a special faculty whereby we come to "see" its nature. Unless one wants to argue that this faculty is a rare gift, we demand explanations of why there is so much dispute about the truth. By abandoning this line of approach positivism has relieved itself of intolerable metaphysical and psychological burdens. But then how does the positivist account for the genesis of specific logical and mathematical truths? In general he gives us no answer. Certain truths follow from the premisses; but the premisses are got by inspiration, guesses, cut and try, etc. We have criteria for the testing of suggested theories. They must first pass tests of logical consistency. And the

results must be fruitful and illuminating; they must unify theories; not be *ad hoc;* and so on in the familiar conventionalist vein. This approach seems to work best for high-level scientific theories that will, so to speak, stand still for relatively long periods of time. The standard example is Newtonian physics. But the difficulties increase as the uses of reason become more humdrum and everyday. It appears that conventionalism requires rather precise, formalized theories for its explanations to be convincing.

So there is an initial attraction to a view of reason that relates it to ordinary problems arising from our daily affairs. Dewey's paradigm case of reasoning seems to be one that might have been followed by a primitive man faced with the problem of, say, opening a coconut. He might imagine himself dropping it from a height onto rocks, or perhaps scraping it against a sharp outcropping of stone. In considering these alternatives he follows through the action in his mind, seeing at each stage the consequences that result. The landscape might present certain features that would indicate the use of a sharp stone. He would then use the stone, rather than go in search of a cliff to throw the nut from. The procedure is rational and efficient within its limits. The most elementary stage would involve mere memory of previous efforts to open coconuts. At a later point some genius might recall that stones with ragged edges had cut through hides better than smooth-edged ones. Perhaps this would work with coconuts too? And so a generalization is born. By stages we can follow the development to the rather advanced technology of the skilled craftsman. But how do we make the transition to pure thought?

At some point, according to Dewey, we find that attention is focused on the purely formal element. "All that was required for the development of mathematics as a science and for the growth of a logic of ideas, that is, of implications of operations with respect to one another, was that some men should appear on the scene who were interested in operations on their own account, as operations, and not as means to specified particular uses."[1] It seems to have been the particular genius of the Greeks to have had a strong sense of form. This is true, of course, of their art; but whether there is any clear connection between their aesthetic sense and the development of logic and geometry remains, in my opinion, doubtful. (I do not see how assertions of this sort can really be validated.) But Dewey is clear that mathematics is not empirical. "When, however, discourse is conducted exclusively with reference to satisfaction of its *own* logical conditions, or, as we say, for its own

[1] *The Quest for Certainty* (New York, 1929), p. 156.

sake, the subject matter is not only non-existential in immediate reference but is itself formed on the ground of freedom from existential reference of even the most indirect, delayed and ulterior kind. It is then mathematical."[2] He goes on to speak of the "transformation of meanings" in a way that would be quite acceptable to the positivist. Lest I should seem to be reading the linguistic theory of the *a priori* into Dewey, let me quote from the footnote to page 301 of the *Logic:* "The necessary relation obtaining between 'antecedent' and 'consequent' in the universal hypothetical is an expression of the fact that there is but one and the same meaning involved, the 'antecedent' and 'consequent' being taken to be its constituent parts. If the 'taking' is correct the relation is (truistically or tautologically) *necessary.*"

A universal statement is a rule for carrying out operations. When it is being used, it is almost definitional in nature. Dewey uses the illustration of a disease and its symptoms; if typhoid then such and such, if diphtheria then such and such. We use this rule as follows. If the consequences of, say, "diphtheria" occur, and these do not fit as well any other disease, we assume that the case before us is in fact diphtheria. We then exercise another relation that "diphtheria" gives us, viz., the remedy of antitoxin. The reasoning involved gathering the symptoms under the rubric "diphtheria"; we could then move into another area covered by the same term, and come up with a course of action aimed at curing the patient. This is all reasonably clear; but we seem to be relying chiefly on the content of the terms or symbols rather than on their form. The formal aspect seems no more than a condensation for the sake of economy in thinking.

Dewey claims that logical discourse must satisfy two criteria, viz., rigor and productivity.[3] The example of diphtheria gave us productive results, but did not seem necessarily logical in *form.* I suppose we could recast the argument in some such form as: all diphtheria sufferers are cured by antitoxin, all persons having such and such symptoms have diphtheria, this person has such and such symptoms, therefore, etc. This is then rigorous in that if A is a member of B, if B is included in C, if C is included in D, then A is a member of D; all this is necessarily true. But the validity of these inclusion relationships is one thing; the truth about how to cure diphtheria is quite another. Most logicians would argue that the formal relationships derive their validity from their tautological nature, which has nothing to do with inquiry. The problem

[2] *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry* (New York, 1938), p. 396.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 314.

of application concerns the right choice of a formal schema that will produce a true and useful result. The best illustration of this is when the physicist turns to the mathematician and finds, e.g., non-Euclidean geometry all worked out and ready for his use. But Dewey will have it that the fundamental and original relationship is in the other direction. Formal notions of class inclusion and exclusion are derived from our experiences in distinguishing this collection of traits from that one. Thus it is not enough to be able to recast the above example in a formal schema; we must try and see how the validity of the argument resides objectively in the procedure used to solve the problem.

Dewey argues that "tautology" must be given a meaning that "does not preclude but rather satisfies the condition of productivity."[4] For most logicians one meaning at least of "tautology" is that it is explicitly non-productive. But let me quote a perplexing sentence from the same page of the *Logic:* "The *conceptions* or meanings found in subsequent propositions in the order of rational discourse are identical with those of antecedent propositions in operational force not in *content* and hence lead rigorously to meanings having *another* content." Dewey goes on to note that it is this difference of content that constitutes productivity in reasoning. The quoted sentence would present no problems if we could identify meanings with formal relationships; but for Dewey a meaning is an indication of a course of action, and hence by no means merely formal.

Dewey gives an example that may help us to get at what he means. Consider the proposition: "An electric current is equal to the potential difference divided by the resistance." Now the expression "electric current" has a different content from "the potential difference divided by the resistance" in the sense that it calls up different images, suggests different possible areas of applicability, etc. One may go farther: two terms may always be said to have distinct contents in the sense that the complete penumbra of associations of each will be different from that of the other in every case. But, operationally, Dewey argues, they are the same; the operational force of "electric current" is precisely and rigorously equal to "the potential difference divided by the resistance." Associated with each term or expression, then, we have two orders or ranges of responses. First, the ***meaning,*** i.e., the course of action indicated by the expression; second, the content, i.e., the features of present or possible situations which the expression calls to mind. Reasoning, or logical discourse,

[4] *Ibid.*

consists in keeping the meanings constant while changing the contents, or envisioning the *same* course of action in *different* circumstances. Rigor results from keeping the meanings constant; productivity from changing the contents. Of course, all this is undertaken in the light of some problem, so that as we shift contents there is a set of consequences that resolve the difficulty if we can hit on them.

Before examining this theory let us try to connect it with Dewey's previously mentioned view on mathematical reasoning. In terms of our recent example, what would be the "existential reference" that would be omitted were the discourse carried on "for its own sake"? Well, the two components we have are meaning and content, and it seems clear that it is the content that will have to go. The meanings in mathematical discourse will still be indicated courses of action; but it will be action on the symbols themselves. Further, since rigor is associated by Dewey with consistency of meaning, mathematics will be rigorous, at least in Dewey's sense of the word. The point I am chiefly concerned to make is that Dewey's view can account for the nature of mathematics and logic as we are habituated to regarding them. We are not required to reconstitute our cherished opinions as we are, for example, by Mill and some of the earlier empiricists. Dewey is not claiming that mathematical truths are kinds of enormously highly confirmed empirical generalizations. Rather it is their function, the way they are used, that gives these truths their peculiar aspect. By being completely irrelevant to *any* empirical situation they appear to be universal facts about "reality."

Consider an example. No one, surely, would deny that 2 times 3 equals 3 times 2. Yet mathematicians fasten on the formal structure, using more general symbols, and call the relation expressed by $ab = ba$ by the name "commutativity." They then inquire what might result if certain courses of action were adopted whereby $ab \neq ba$. In the mathematical theory of groups especially, much attention has been paid to non-commutative aggregates. In short, we use numbers in practical affairs as though they were eternal, immutable entities, obeying established and unshakable laws. And for the purposes at hand this is clearly the way they should be used. But suppose we turn our attention to the "numbers" themselves; suppose our "problematic situation" is not one of measurement and calculation in everyday life. A mathematician may consider a situation in which the everyday rule is not assumed to hold. Initially, this situation is highly problematic. What does he do? Well, he operates with the symbols, obeying the usual rules; and

also obeying the special rule, instituted for the purpose of this particular inquiry, that $ab \neq ba$. He considers the courses of action open to him under this rule with the general aim of developing an extensive, elegant, and interesting theory. The theory of non-commutative algebras then *results* from his investigation; after he has worked out a variety of possible consequences, he is in a position to organize the outcome into *the* theory of, say, non-commutative groups. In short, he proceeds in pretty much the same way as Dewey describes for any inquiry. While I have used commutativity as an example, the same procedure would apply to other concepts of mathematics and logic.

But still, it may be claimed, the mathematician is able to produce these results because, in some sense, they were already there. It is true that mathematicians avoid using terms like "discover," but they also refrain from claiming that they *invent* theorems. Usually they use a neutral expression such as "this theorem is due to Gauss" or "this proof was first given by Cauchy." Often, though, they will say that a theorem was first *proved* by so and so, with the seeming implication that the theorem was already there and only the proof was new. However, I think that this feeling of the antecedent existence of mathematical truths is mistaken on two counts. First, we must recognize that *formal* truths do not have a date; unlike empirical truths, they are timeless. So we don't want to say that non-Euclidean geometry came into existence with Saccheri, Gauss, or whomever. That would imply that prior to a certain time there was no such geometry, which is close to saying that assertions about, say, triangles with more than 180 degrees were false at one time and later became true. The "truth" of a purely formal proposition lies in its relations: a single formal symbol is neither true nor false, a complex formal symbol derives its "truth" from the system of relations of which it is a part and which goes to make it up. If it is "true" in its role within the system, then it is *always* true—as long as it plays the same role in the same system. If its relations change, it changes; its meaning consists in the operations which may be performed upon it, which operations constitute the system of which the symbol is a member. Empirical propositions, on the other hand, contain symbols which have both meaning *and* content. Since the content relates to extra-linguistic matters of fact, the time at which the proposition is uttered is relevant to its truth. The first reason, then, why we tend to feel that formal truths were "there" waiting to be discovered is that we tend to ontologize logic. A timeless truth is taken as an eternal truth.

The second objection to antecedent existence may, at first sight, appear to give back all that the first objection took away. For I *do* want to argue that, in a certain sense, the formal truths *were* already there. We must bear in mind Dewey's contention that logical forms accrue in the activity of inquiry. In other words, while logical forms do not have antecedent existence in a world of their own, they are not instantaneously created either. Inquiry develops certain forms arising out of the need to produce solutions that resolve discordancies. Hence the initial location of form is in a complex of inquiry; the specialized attention to pure form is a later development, necessarily, not merely historically. Therefore, the recognition of the form *qua* form is indeed after the fact. But it is a recognition of something that we put there in the first place; the inquiries from which the form was abstracted arose from our needs, our problems, and our situations. So even the purest of mathematicians is dealing with implications of terms previously instituted in inquiry. And of course the results of his investigations can and do influence the course of future inquiry, both as to applications, e.g., physics, and as to methodology, e.g., axiomatics. Hence, when conceding this type of antecedent existence to formal truths, we are not falling back into the two-worlds theory.

Let us apply this approach to perhaps the toughest nut of all, the law of non-contradiction. Nothing can be both A and not-A in the same respect at the same time. Aside from the weasel words "in the same respect," and aside from the implicit definition of "thing," the ultimate justification of this law is pragmatic. Even Aristotle uses the argument that violation of the law would stultify discourse. So the law of non-contradiction seems to be perhaps the widest and most general of the forms required by successful inquiry; but not even this law requires any concession to the "world of eternal truths" viewpoint.

Now many of these arguments are familiar. They are used by positivists and conventionalists against rationalists and realists. It should be evident that Dewey is no rationalist, and I have mentioned above some of the general ways in which he differs from the positivists, although indeed he has much in common with them. But there is one further weakness in the positivistic approach that should be brought out. It is pretty generally admitted that the earlier rigid view of positivism, best exemplified by O. Neurath, has to be abandoned. One of several efforts made to retrieve the situation involves the use of metalanguages and "methodological rules." These latter especially enable the positivist to retain his rigorous, hypothetico-deductive system, and yet to provide himself

with some grounds for choosing among the many such systems available. By moving in this direction positivism becomes a form of conventionalism. But the very name "conventionalism" indicates that this will hardly do. A convention is arbitrary, agreed upon merely as a matter of convenience, like the agreement to drive on the right hand side of the road. The choice of the convention that will be adopted in inquiry is guided by the needs of the situation; it is ridiculous to claim that we choose Einsteinian physics over Newtonian by an arbitrary fiat. We "choose" it because the facts of inquiry dictate its selection for objective reasons that are evident to every physicist. It is a fact of the situation that certain inquiries are balked and frustrated when Newtonian physics is used; these paths become open when Einsteinian modifications are accepted. The development, then, of these anomalous "methodological rules" would seem to require the recasting of positivist theory along more explicitly Deweyan lines.

I have devoted my attention up to now primarily to Dewey's views on reason as it operates in mathematics and logic because a conception of reason considered as a form of experience, activity, and inquiry, is presumably weakest in dealing with the purely formal modes. However, I find that Dewey does quite well here. Mathematicians and logicians do not contemplate; they calculate. Rationalist views seem to me unreal, as well as difficult to understand. But these formal modes are only part of the activity of reason, and I want to devote the next section of this paper to a consideration of some of the other areas in which reason operates. In particular, I want to examine Dewey's theory of value and his close association of reason with scientific method.

III

Whatever one approves of or disapproves of in Dewey it would be inaccurate to overlook the strong materialistic and behavioristic elements in his thought. He often claims that no progress can be made in inquiry until the physical environment is altered. Now presumably reasoning is a symbolic rearranging of the environment. But Dewey's emphasis is always on the actual change in the situation in which the inquiry is taking place. And the changes are almost exclusively public, social manipulations of the physical surroundings. For a philosopher who locates the origin of all meanings in experience, Dewey is surprisingly objective. For, if meanings arise from experience, it would seem that they would suffer from the taint of subjectivity. For example, it might seem that the emotive theory of ethical propositions would have

affinities with Dewey's position. Yet the case is quite otherwise; the strong naturalistic strain in Dewey leads him to an ethical theory of a quite different type. Similarly, we might ask why two different people, carrying out inquiries into similar problems, should come to similar conclusions. The answer would be simple if we were entitled to assume that there is an antecedently existing truth at which they both arrive, but we are not so entitled. In short, our question is, How does experience hold together so well for Dewey? How can he dispense with absolute standards, and yet be so confident of objectivity? We were able earlier to arrive at a fairly satisfactory answer to these questions as asked of mathematics and logic by recognizing the *ex post facto* element in formal thinking. But formal reasoning is only one aspect of reasoning; in particular, it is reasoning only about meanings, not contents. Let us place reason in the broader context more typical of Dewey.

Rational thought in general is a kind of experience for Dewey: "Instead of there being a fixed difference between it [experience] and something higher—rational thought—there is a difference between two kinds of experience; one which is occupied with uncontrolled change and one concerned with directed and regulated change. And this difference . . . does not mark a fixed division."[5] We then ask: Toward what end or by what criteria does one direct and regulate change? Consider the following from *Human Nature and Conduct* (p. 196): "'Reason' as a noun signifies the happy cooperation of a multitude of dispositions, such as sympathy, curiosity, exploration, experimentation, frankness, pursuit—to follow things through—circumspection, to look about at the context, etc., etc. The elaborate systems of science are born not of reason, but of impulses at first slight and flickering; impulses to handle, move about, to hunt, to uncover, to mix things separated and divide things combined, to talk and to listen. . . . Reason, the rational attitude, is the resulting disposition, not a ready-made antecedent which can be invoked at will and set into movement." In other words, man in his environment is inherently unstable. Whether it be by impulses within man or discordancies between him and nature, the harmony is continually breaking down, and being continually restored. Reason is an ordering, the harmonious interplay of diverse strands of experience.

We might ask why we should call this happy state of affairs reason. Is not nature then more reasonable than man? A jungle, where the order of nature reigns supreme, is an excellent example of the careful adjustment of ends and means. Of course, the

[5] *Quest for Certainty*, p. 83.

rationality of nature may be more evident to the lion who eats the antelope, than it is to the antelope. Obviously, the *kind* of harmony, the quality of the "happy cooperation of a multitude of dispositions," is of overriding importance. What criteria does Dewey offer us for deciding between alternative harmonies?

Before going on with this point I want to call attention to a certain element in Dewey's thought that is quite evident at this particular point. I have already remarked on the affinities Dewey has with conventionalism. But many of the features of conventionalism are of an idealistic cast. In particular, there is the emphasis on coherence. When every experiment, in a sense, tests the whole of science, you are not far from a coherence theory of truth. Indeed, for a while even positivists inclined in this direction, especially Neurath and, for a time, Carnap. Now if reason is a kind of harmony of man with himself and with nature, it is obvious that one makes assertions on the basis of warrants that cohere within a harmonious whole. So Dewey himself becomes a modified adherent of the coherence theory of truth. Our previous question, then, as to what holds experience together for Dewey is easily answered. Experience is unified, insofar as it is controlled and directed, by the activity of thinking in such a way that direction and control are exercised precisely in the interests of unity and harmony. In this connection I want to state, without going into my reasons for so stating, that I do not think that Dewey has shown that there is anything "outside of" experience. If that is sufficient to convict him of idealism, then I think he stands convicted. But traditional idealism is excessively infected with rationalism, although not, of course, of the realistic type. Certainly it is the case that Dewey is not an idealist in the traditional sense; that there are fundamental grounds for distinguishing him from the idealists, I shall try to indicate shortly. In any event I don't think that the distinction is to be made by claiming that there is something outside of experience.

To return to our problem, we have already abandoned any Aristotelian notions of antecedent truths and essential natures. Also, we are not to consider reason as a faculty or power. How, then, are we to choose between alternative sets of consequences both of which evince the desired concordance of ends with means that is the mark of rationality? Dewey says: "The man who would intelligently cultivate intelligence will widen, not narrow, his life of strong impulses. . . ."[6] Our question is, Why? if our only aim is "their happy coincidence in operation."[7]

[6] *Human Nature and Conduct* (Modern Library edition), p. 196.
[7] *Ibid.*

The answer is, of course, quite obvious. We need, as Dewey says, "a balanced distribution of thought and energy."[8] My objection is not to this answer. Rather the difficulty is that there is nothing particularly Deweyan about it. It seems that Dewey is here falling back into a Humean or positivist view of reason. Reason, so to speak, spreads before the passions a selection of alternatives; the passions then select the consequences most desirable. "Men *like* some of the consequences and *dislike* others."[9] Reason, then, in its function as a calculating machine, grinds out the most efficacious methods or means, the passions having chosen the ends. Now this is admittedly a caricature of what Dewey is aiming at. But I contend that this view of reason can be found in his writings, and moreover that lapses of this sort are not accidental. They arise out of a fundamental vacillation in his thought. The key difficulty seems to me to center around Dewey's striving for objectivity. I have already indicated how well I think he has met the demand for objectivity in formal reasoning. But at the level of concrete inquiry he is faced with the quicksands of subjectivity. At the formal level the problem is one step removed; at the level of content it is immediate.

Dewey attempts to avoid the chaos of subjectivity in two ways. I have already indicated one of them, the lapse into the Humean view. But this lapse is not a mere inadvertence. The Humean view is most suitable as an analysis of scientific inquiry. In fact, the Humean view, together with a kind of naturalized Kantianism, forms the basis for the contemporary positivistic and conventionalistic philosophies of science as already discussed. So Dewey's concern with scientific methodology quite naturally leads him in this direction. After all, the kind of subjectivity represented by scientific conventionalism hardly threatens to loose mere anarchy upon the world. This tendency of Dewey's thought is also revealed by his behavioristic, at times even materialistic, leanings.

But far more interesting, and far more consonant with the main drift of Dewey's thought, is the second way in which he attempts to meet the problem of subjectivity. This is his theory of the rationality of evaluation. The Humean tendencies noted above were buttressed by citations from *Human Nature and Conduct*. In *The Quest for Certainty* this problem is dealt with via a more sophisticated analysis. I do not want to go off into a discussion of Dewey's theory of valuation; my sole concern is with his view of reason. But it is clear, I think, that a great deal turns on the success of

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 198.
[9] *Ibid.*, p. 225 (Dewey's italics).

the valuation theory. On the one hand, if the theory fails and if Dewey's followers wish to hold to *some* view of reason, they will come face to face with the positivistic side of Dewey. Given the general tenor of his philosophy, this might well lead to some form of idealism, which positivism seems periodically inclined toward anyway. On the other hand, if Dewey has failed to convince us that valuing is a rational activity, we may say so much the worse for reason. In this case some of the affinities that Dewey has with existentialism could come to the fore. There is, of course, another possibility: existentialists might give more effort toward clarifying their own ideal of reason, and Dewey might prove useful to them.

I shall conclude, then, with a brief description of Dewey's attempt to show that valuing is a rational activity. In *The Quest for Certainty* he uses an analogy with his theory of ideas. Just as truths result from inquiry rather than being antecedent to it, so possible values become values in the course of inquiry. Value is even defined as "enjoyments which are the consequences of intelligent action."[10] This seems, at first sight, rather arbitrary. But Dewey points out that there is an ambiguity in the word "value."[11] If we merely mean "enjoy," then we are simply stating a fact. The sentence, "I value friendship," expresses an autobiographical fact; it is not a valuation. If I say, "Friendship is valuable," I am indeed making a valuation; but now it is natural to ask me to justify the shift to the "able" form of the word. My justification will then involve a description of the inquiry by which I reached that conclusion, and that inquiry is the very *fons et origo* of rationality we have already established. But if we stopped at this point there would be something verbal and sophistical about the argument. The real force of Dewey's position seems to lie in his conception of the intimate relation between reason and activity. Unfortunately I am not able to cite texts for the following points, but must content myself with the rather vague statement that this is where Dewey seems *to me* to be heading. An enjoyment or satisfaction is promoted to the status of a value after it has been "worked over" in a certain way. I use this expression because I want to indicate that more is involved than a deduction of factual consequences, although this is part of it. The symbolic activity of reasoning can have a richness and immediacy that is not to be found in traditional, abstract notions about reason. Reasoning, for Dewey, involves content; it is not merely that it has content. And if the symbolic activity engaged in is to be efficacious, it must,

[10] *Quest for Certainty*, p. 259.
[11] *Logic*, p. 172.

as pointed out earlier, retain the same meaning as applied in thought to different contents. In terms of evaluative reasoning, then, the process will involve symbolic valuing in the various possible resulting situations. There is a passage in the *Logic* (p. 173) that I would like to interpret along these lines: "The only way of answering the questions, of resolving the doubts that have arisen, is to review the existential consequences which will probably occur *if* esteem, admiration, enjoyment are engaged in. For attitudes, esteem, etc., are active attitudes; they are *ways of acting* which produce consequences, and consequences can be *groundedly* anticipated only as consequences of conditions that are operative."

Here, again, it is possible to read this in a Humean fashion; the consequences can be taken as certain states of affairs that will result if esteem, etc., are engaged in. But there is another way of looking at the matter. We are of course anticipating certain states of affairs, but Dewey is claiming that we are doing something else besides. We are examining in thought a possible future situation made up of anticipated factual states *plus* ourselves as acting and reacting to these states. That is, we anticipate not only what the facts will be, not only what will be our state of mind; but we anticipate the effective modifications that this future state will call forth. The real force of Dewey's view comes out only if we realize that anticipating a state of mind and envisaging the way we shall act are the same thing.

Compare two experiences, one called "thinking" and another called "liking." Both involve modes of behavior. In the first case we are able to manipulate states of affairs in thought so as to resolve the problem we are concerned with; in so doing we are occupied with controlling our experience, and this is called rational thought or reasoning. Valuing, correspondingly, is concerned with another form of experience, viz., "liking." In valuing we symbolically manipulate *ourselves*, in thought, in relation to some context or other. We examine, in advance, the ways in which we might behave in these contexts. Some forms of behavior we characterize as "liking," others as "disliking." Suppose our symbolic representation of our behavior has chiefly the features we associate with liking; we then conclude our evaluation by saying that the context in question has "value." Let me try to make this clearer by means of an example. Suppose a friend comes by with tickets to a baseball game. At the moment I feel like staying home and reading. But I think of myself at the ball park, I see myself following the plays with close attention, anticipating the next moves of the rival managers, listening to the shouts of the crowd, etc. In

short, I envisage the features of the behavior I would exhibit if I were at the ball game. Such features constitute "enjoying a ball game." Alternatively, I sketch out to myself the forms of behavior that are likely to be associated with my staying home and reading. I thus weigh the values of the two situations and make my decision. Note that I am not, while making up my mind, actually exhibiting any of this behavior; I am not simply applying my present set of affects to an imagined state of affairs. Rather I am describing forms of behavior I *would* exhibit if I *were* at, say, the ball game in advance of my actually having these experiences. The symbolic future states of affairs in rational thought are paralleled by symbolic future affective modes of behavior in valuation, which is why valuing is rational.

The obvious objection to this theory is its dependence on behaviorism. ". . . liking and disliking in their connection with valuation are to be considered in terms of observable and identifiable modes of behavior. . . ."[12] While Dewey himself is clearly thinking of behaviorism in the sense of a psychological theory, it might be possible to reinterpret his approach as a "logical behaviorism" along the lines of Ryle. While the behaviorism is perhaps objectionable, the effort to circumvent the mind-body dualism is in accordance with many contemporary philosophical movements. Certainly it is important to realize that the mind-body problem has not only affected psychology and epistemology in general, it has also had important consequences for our views on the very nature of reason. The Humean view in particular suffers from a dualistic tendency.

IV

In good Deweyan fashion I have put off questions of definition until the end of my inquiry. I want now to set forth my desiderata for an adequate theory of reason; and I think these can best be got at by considering the various areas in which we expect and desire rationality. They are roughly three. The first is, of course, formal thought; this is usually considered to be the very seat of rationality. A second area is science, i.e., organized, controlled, and fruitful inquiries into matters of fact. And, thirdly, we have what is usually consigned to the "subjective," viz., wishes, desires, likings, etc., or, in general, value. It seems to me an undoubted fact that in each of these areas there exist forms of behavior which are justly called reasonable or rational. The task for a theory of reason lies in giving a coherent and plausible account of precisely

[12] *Theory of Valuation* (Chicago, 1939), p. 13.

what the *rationality* of this behavior consists in. The usual approach is to start with formal reasoning and move on to science, and, if possible, value. Not only rationalist philosophers take this tack; the hypothetico-deductive explanation of scientific thinking is of this sort.

Dewey's approach is quite different; he forms his view of reason on what he considers to be the scientific model, and then extends this view to formal thought on the one hand, and theories of value on the other. In this paper I have not gone into the question of the adequacy of Dewey's account of scientific thought. My major interest has been his effort to extend his views to formal reasoning and value. Part II of this paper dealt with Dewey's ideas of mathematics and logic, and I found his account quite plausible. But there are many philosophers and mathematicians who would disagree. Like most sympathizers with Dewey's philosophy, I continue to feel that he suffers enormously from misunderstandings and misreadings. This has been especially the case with his views of formal reasoning. Perhaps a comparison of Dewey's position with the intuitionist or constructivist philosophies of mathematics might throw some light on the actual processes of mathematical thinking.

However, the difficulties with Dewey's view of reason that I have been most concerned to point up are those arising from his theory of value. In Part III of this paper I gave as persuasive an account of this theory as I was able to manage. Yet I remain doubtful. In general, when a theory fails it is not because it produces blatant contradictions, or totally erroneous predictions. Rather, an inadequate theory creates distortions in the subject matter; certain facts have to be put to one side, others become exaggerated, relations become strained. This is how I feel about portions, at least, of Dewey's theory of valuation. A major problem in this area concerns the dependence of his theory on behavioristic psychology. I am not at all concerned about the theory's making use of psychology; naturalistic theories will always tend to do this, and I think it a virtue rather than a weakness. But then it is incumbent upon us to justify the selection of one particular theory of psychology. Even behaviorism seems to have been considerably modified in recent years. And there are many other theories that deserve consideration in any naturalistic inquiry into value. Especially if one gives any credence whatsoever to psychoanalytic theories of personality, Dewey's position is placed in question. Essentially, it seems to me, he tries to solve the problems arising from human subjectivity by denying that there

is any such thing. Many contemporary philosophers (I mentioned Ryle in the previous section) heartily approve of this approach. They do so for the same reasons which motivate Dewey; they want to oppose the mind-body dualism, and the subjectivity-objectivity distinction seems to them a reflection of this perennial dispute. I am not so sure that this is the case, since the phenomena usually called subjective are quite real; the difficulties are brought about when one adopts the subjectivity-objectivity distinction. If one must use this, then certain perfectly common human experiences have to be forced into one pigeonhole or the other, and so into the category of subjective they go. In getting rid of the "ghost in the machine" it is the whole conception that must be rejected. But many philosophers—Dewey, I think, included—merely dispose of the ghost, leaving us with the machine. As happens so often, efforts at obliterating a false distinction end up by reducing one term of the distinction to the other.

However, in the light of some of the larger issues mentioned at the beginning of this paper, I feel that Dewey's whole approach deserves careful examination. The advantages of his theory, or an improved version of it, are obvious. It would make it possible to ground many existentialist insights that are now regarded as irrational. It would permit a reconciliation with idealism, an idealism broadened to include a more complex view of experience. Whether it is possible to work out such a theory in detail I do not know; much of this paper has been taken up with my doubts. But I am convinced that Dewey has made a valuable start. If we are to be successful in reworking our views of reason I am sure that many useful insights are to be found in the general tendencies of Dewey's position that I have tried to emphasize.

CHAUNCEY B. DOWNES

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY

BOOK REVIEW

Art and Analysis; an Essay toward a Theory in Aesthetics. EDWARD G. BALLARD. The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1957. xiv, 219 pp. 15.25 Guilders.

Edward Ballard's *Art and Analysis* may be not unfairly described as an elaborate attempt to recover the semiotic theory of art from Ernest Nagel's well-known criticism of Susanne Langer's *Philosophy in a New Key,* namely, that her "symbolic forms" appear to symbolize nothing. Reference to Nagel's observation is

mentioned only once, though at an important point in the discussion, and the entire volume brings together such diverse philosophical references that the focus suggested may seem implausible. Yet, this is the only clue I can find that gives point to these variegated references themselves. I find also that the effort is unsuccessful.

Ballard offers the following definition ("not yet complete") of the work of art: "it is an iconic sign or a natural symbol of the forms of feeling which are intrinsically valued and through which it is appreciated" (p. 76; cf. p. 81, for the deficiency noted). "Forms of feeling" had been one of Mrs. Langer's expressions covering the view Nagel had criticized; so Ballard may be expected to have attempted to overcome the difficulty, since he freely acknowledges the effectiveness of the criticism (p. 70). His solution is given in the following forms:

> the object signified is the analogue of the sign in the appreciator's psychic and physical organism. The aesthetic object signifies the aesthetic experience. [P. 74.]

> The thing which is signified is a model of the (external) symbol constructed *within* the psyche of the aesthetic interpreter, i.e., the appreciator. Just how this psychic construct should be described is a problem for the psychologist to solve. [P. 73.]

> In the aesthetic experience, the subject conforms to . . . his psyche reconstructs a model (or models) of the object, reflecting the object's form in his own psychic organization. Alternately expressed, on an occasion of aesthetic experience one can abstract the same partial pattern from the objective work and also from the appreciator; this *conformation* of the subject to the object is enjoyed for its own sake. [Pp. 75–76, italics mine.]

I have taken the liberty of citing a variety of formulas by which Ballard seeks to explain how aesthetic symbols symbolize, because the thesis seems quite incredible and because a reader may be led to mistrust paraphrase or brief excerpt (cf. also pp. 93–94, 101–102, 116–117, 121–122, 186–187).

If I understand the first quotation, Ballard is committed to the following view: that there is no difference between what an "aesthetic object signifies" and the experience of what an "aesthetic object signifies." The object in fact signifies the experience of the object. And if I understand the third quotation, Ballard is committed to the following view: that what we appreciate aesthetically is not an "aesthetic object" but a resemblance ("conformation") between the "form" of such an object and the "form" of some internal psychic model "constructed" to resemble the first. It seems clear, furthermore, that, by the second quotation, Ballard has invented a superfluous and logically posterior object for an "aesthetic object" to symbolize. Why can't we simply say we

perceive, experience, appreciate a work of art rather than a (by definition) necessary resemblance between the "external" object and some trumped-up "internal psychic model"?

Ballard's definition of a work of art also marks its genus to be that of iconic signs (p. 72). In this respect, he acknowledges his agreement with C. W. Morris (p. 71) as well as with Mrs. Langer. It was of course to accommodate both Nagel's criticism and the orthodox semiotic view that he was induced to develop his peculiar notion of the "psychic construct." Ballard takes it that Morris' "iconic symbol," Langer's "presentational symbol," and his own "natural symbol" are more or less the same (pp. 71–72), and he holds further that "the aesthetic symbol . . . is always a natural symbol" (p. 65). Nevertheless, in explaining this notion of "natural symbol," Ballard observes:

> The artificial or conventional symbol may be assigned to its referent in the most arbitrary manner imaginable. Evidently, though, there is a certain fittingness between the natural symbol and its referent. St. Augustine has suggested as an example of this kind of symbol the footprint in the sand which naturally signifies the man who *made* it; Carritt suggests that a smile *naturally* signifies happiness or friendliness. [P. 65, italics mine.]

He nowhere mentions C. S. Peirce's semiotic distinctions, but in Peirce's system these "natural symbols" would be indexical rather than iconic, depending on a recognition of causal relations rather than resemblances. That Ballard obscures this distinction is at once clear from his remark (immediately following) that "the nature common both to the natural symbol and to its referent is their *common pattern*" (p. 65, italics mine). He is thinking of the resemblance of a footprint to the foot that made it (what of a smudged footprint or of viewing a footprint as a sign without attention to its resemblance to a foot?). He also takes a smile to be "the visible or sensible image or analogue of its referent," as the symbol, say, of friendship (p. 65). The other illustrations offered here include the chemical formula, HNO_3, as "the natural symbol of nitric acid" (p. 65), which shows that "natural" and "conventional" cannot be opposed. He also offers a thunderstorm as a symbol for anger, "for it seems *spontaneously to suggest* this feeling," that is, by some "emotive bond of similarity" (p. 66, italics mine). I am inclined to think that Ballard's own remarks would make this out to be indexical rather than iconic, though it is clear he wishes to treat it as the latter. Otherwise, we may ask whether white is a "natural symbol" for death or for purity because "it spontaneously suggests" these things *in different cultures*. Ballard himself considers this sort of case within a cultural context (cf. p. 67), exhibiting unintentionally, therefore, the difficulty of dis-

tinguishing iconic and symbolic signs here (speaking in Peirce's sense). I cannot refrain from adding that a thunderstorm, on Ballard's definition of a work of art and terminological usage, would provide a paradigm for "work of art."

When he examines the aesthetic context more at length, Ballard tends to view the form of an "aesthetic object" much in the manner of the Platonists—yet escaping Idealism (cf. pp. 98, 57–58, 124), and the motivation of the aesthetic experience along Freudian lines —yet as a royal lie (cf. pp. 117–122; also pp. 108–117, 122–124).

JOSEPH MARGOLIS

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI

NEW BOOKS

AMBROSE, ALICE, AND LAZEROWITZ, MORRIS: *Logic: The Theory of Formal Inference.* New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston [1961]. vi, 78 p. $2.00.

COPI, IRVING M.: *Introduction to Logic.* Second Edition. New York: Macmillan [1961]. xviii, 512 p. $5.25.

DEWEY, ROBERT E.; GRAMLICH, FRANCIS W.; LOFTSGORDON, DONALD, EDS.: *Problems of Ethics; a Book of Readings.* New York: Macmillan [1961]. ix, 483 p. $6.00.

MARTIN, GOTTFRIED: *An Introduction to General Metaphysics.* Tr. by Eva Schaper and Ivor Leclerc. With a Foreword by Sir David Ross. London: Allen & Unwin [1961]. 156 p. 18 s.

MAYER, CHARLES LEOPOLD: *Sensation: The Origin of Life.* Tr. and with a Preface by Harold A. Larrabee. [Yellow Springs, Ohio]: Antioch Press, 1961. xii, 145 p. $3.50.

MUNN, ALLAN M.: *Free-Will and Determinism.* [Toronto]: Univ. of Toronto Press, 1960. 218 p. $6.00.

NEWMAN, RALPH A.: *Equity and Law: A Comparative Study.* New York: Oceana Publications [1961]. 280 p. $7.50.

NOTES AND NEWS

The Fifty-ninth Annual Meeting of the Western Division of the American Philosophical Association will be held in St. Louis, Missouri, May 4–6, 1961, with St. Louis University as the host institution. Sessions will be held at the Coronado Hotel.

The Secretary-Treasurer of the Division, to whom inquiries may be addressed, is Professor Morris Keeton, Antioch Springs, Yellow Springs, Ohio.

For students making their first prolonged approach to the intellectual problems of religion

INTRODUCTION TO RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY

By Geddes MacGregor,
University of Southern California

The author's purpose is to encourage the student to develop a more critical attitude toward the philosophical problems that religion raises and to appreciate more keenly the nature of religion itself.

"The manner of presentation is admirably suited to the generation for which it is intended, and, although written as a textbook, the material is presented interestingly enough to whet the appetite of many a more general religious reader than merely the undergraduate student.

"The book has good balance for a contemporary introduction to its subject matter: it is divided into many short sections of irregular length within its major divisions, which fact adds to its readability. Discussion questions conclude each chapter and there is also a useful bibliography at the end—with some useful words about using the bibliography included." From a review in *The Living Church*, October 1959

"The book is written in an engagingly informal style and with a simplicity and clarity which are most commendable. I can recommend it as a compact treatment of basic issues of philosophy of religion to students in introductory religion courses. Its sectional and topical division of material is most helpful for work at this level." Gerald Cooke, Oberlin College, Ohio

384 pages 1959 paperbound $2.95 clothbound $4.50

Houghton Mifflin Company

BOSTON · NEW YORK · ATLANTA · GENEVA, ILL · DALLAS · PALO ALTO

Living Issues in Philosophy

An Introductory Textbook • Third Edition

Harold H. Titus, *Denison University*

This classic text, comprehensive in that it introduces the student to the entire field of philosophy, explains the basic characteristics of each school of philosophical thought and presents philosophy as a means of integrating the various phases of human experience. A brief historical survey of each topic is given. Questions and projects and an annotated reading list are provided at the end of each chapter.

Ethics for Today

Third Edition

Harold H. Titus, *Denison University*

The emphasis in this text is on ethical problems that the average person is likely to encounter in everyday life. The origin and development of traditional ethical theories are covered. The ethical implications of some of today's most crucial issues are discussed, giving direction to young people in their search for satisfactory standards of personal and social morality. End-of-chapter materials include questions, projects, and suggested readings.

Great Traditions in Ethics

An Introduction

Ethel M. Albert, *University of California*
Theodore C. Denise and Sheldon P. Peterfreund,
Syracuse University

Philosophical readings from original sources are used in this text to illustrate Western ethical thinking from ancient to modern times. Biographical and introductory materials provide a functional frame of reference for each theory. The selections are broken down into manageable components, numbered for easy reference. Each chapter ends with questions, a key to the original sources, a list of inexpensive editions of the source materials, and a bibliography.

COLLEGE DIVISION

55 Fifth Avenue, New York 3, New York

American Book Company